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Abstract
It is common to see a handful of reviewers reject a highly novel paper, because they view, say, extensive experiments as
far more important than novelty, whereas the community as a whole would have embraced the paper. More generally, the
disparate mapping of criteria scores to final recommendations by different reviewers is a major source of inconsistency in
peer review. In this paper we present a framework — based on L(p, q)-norm empirical risk minimization — for learning the
community’s aggregate mapping. We draw on computational social choice to identify desirable values of p and q; specifically,
we characterize p = q = 1 as the only choice that satisfies three natural axiomatic properties. Finally, we implement and
apply our approach to reviews from IJCAI 2017.
1 Introduction
The essence of science is the search for objective truth, yet scientific work is typically evaluated through peer review
— a notoriously subjective process.1 The former editor of the British Medical Journal writes (Smith 2006):
“People have a great many fantasies about peer review, and one of the most powerful is that it is a highly objective,
reliable, and consistent process. I regularly received letters from authors who were upset that the BMJ rejected
their paper and then published what they thought to be a much inferior paper on the same subject. Always they
saw something underhand. They found it hard to accept that peer review is a subjective and, therefore, inconsistent
process.”
Of course, this criticism is equally relevant to computer science in general, and AI in particular, but AI researchers
have been playing a leading role in using their craft to propose and test new approaches to peer review (Roos, Rothe,
and Scheuermann 2011; Charlin and Zemel 2013; Ge, Welling, and Ghahramani 2013; Lawrence and Cortes 2014;
Kurokawa et al. 2015; Shah et al. 2017).
We contribute to this effort by examining one of the sources of inconsistency in peer review: the mapping from
criteria scores to overall recommendation. Specifically, most conferences ask reviewers to score papers on criteria
such as novelty, significance, and technical quality. But there is rarely any guidance as to how these criteria should
be aggregated in order to arrive at a recommendation in a principled way. As a consequence, the acceptance decision
on each paper is governed by the subjective opinions of a handful of reviewers (who review that paper) regarding the
relative importance of various criteria. Furthermore, these aggregation rules are not consistent across different papers.
A fascinating exception, which serves as a case in point, is the 27th AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence
(AAAI 2013). Reviewers were asked to score papers, on a scale of 1–6, according to the following criteria: technical
quality, experimental analysis, formal analysis, clarity/presentation, novelty of the question, novelty of the solution,
breadth of interest, and potential impact. The admirable goal of the program chairs was to select “exciting but imperfect
papers” over “safe but solid” papers, and, to this end, they provided detailed instructions on how to map the foregoing
criteria to an overall recommendation. For example, the preimage of ‘strong accept’ is “a 5 or 6 in some category, no
1 in any category,” that is, reviewers were instructed to strongly accept a paper that has a 5 or 6 in, say, clarity, but is
below average according to each and every other criterion (i.e., a clearly boring paper). Some reviewers chose not to
follow these instructions, as noted by the program chairs in an email to a subset of the program committee:
“Note that the reviewer forms have directions for how to assign the summary score. Ideally, this score would have
been automated, but it was not. Some reviewers have not properly applied the rules.”
Although the specific issue we described can be alleviated via a revised mapping of criteria to recommendations,
that hand-crafted revised mapping is likely to have its own quirks. In summary, the AAAI-13 anecdote highlights the
difficulty of devising a principled mapping from criteria scores to recommendations.
1Even papers about peer review are subject to peer review, the irony of which has not escaped us.
To address this problem, we propose an approach based on machine learning and social choice, which provides
a mapping from criteria scores to recommendations capturing the opinion of the entire (reviewer) community. From
a machine learning perspective, the examples are reviews, each consisting of criteria scores (the input point) and an
overall recommendation (the label). We make the innocuous assumption that each reviewer has a monotonic mapping
in mind, in the sense that a paper whose scores are at least as high as those of another paper on every criterion would
receive an overall recommendation that is at least as high; the reviews submitted by a particular reviewer can be seen
as observations of that mapping. Given these data, we find a single monotonic mapping that minimizes a loss function
(which we will discuss momentarily). We can then apply this mapping to the criteria scores associated with each
review, to obtain new overall recommendations, which replace the original ones.
In the foregoing framework, the overall recommendation initially given by a reviewer only serves to express an
opinion about the desired mapping in one particular case; we achieve consistency across reviews by discarding these
initial recommendations and applying a single mapping, which is the output of the learning process, exclusively to
criteria scores. Therefore, this process lies in the realm of computational social choice (Brandt et al. 2016): it can be
seen as aggregating individual opinions over mappings into a consensus mapping. From this viewpoint, it is natural
to select the loss function so that the resulting aggregation method satisfies socially desirable properties, such as
consensus (if all reviewers agree then the aggregate mapping should coincide with their recommendations), efficiency
(if one paper dominates another then its overall recommendation should be at least as high), and strategyproofness
(reviewers cannot pull the aggregate mapping closer to their own recommendations by misreporting them).
Specifically, we focus on the the family of L(p, q) loss functions, for p, q ∈ [1,∞], which resembles the L(p, q)
norm of a matrix. Our question, then, is:
For what values of p and q does our aggregation method, which chooses a monotonic mapping that minimizes
the L(p, q) loss on the given reviews, satisfy consensus, efficiency, and strategyproofness?
Our main theoretical result is a characterization theorem that gives a decisive answer to this question: the three prop-
erties are satisfied if and only if p = q = 1. This result singles out an instantiation of our approach that we view as
particularly attractive and well grounded.
We also provide empirical results, which analyze properties of our approach when applied to a dataset of 9197
reviews from IJCAI 2017. One vignette is that the papers selected by L(1, 1) aggregation have a 79.2% overlap with
actual list of accepted papers, suggesting that our approach makes a significant difference compared to the status quo
(arguably for the better).
2 Our Framework
Suppose there are n reviewers R = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and a set P of m papers, denoted using letters such as a, b, c. Each
reviewer i reviews a subset of papers, denoted by P (i) ⊆ P . Conversely, let R(a) denote the set of all reviewers
who review paper a. Each reviewer assigns scores to each of their papers on d different criteria, such as novelty,
experimental analysis, and technical quality, and also gives an overall recommendation. We denote the criteria scores
given by reviewer i to paper a by xia, and the corresponding overall recommendation by yia. Let X1,X2, . . . ,Xd
denote the domains of the d criteria scores, and let X = X1 × X2 × · · · × Xd. Also, let Y denote the domain of the
overall recommendations. For concreteness, we assume that each Xk as well as Y is the real line. However, our results
hold more generally, even if these domains are non-singleton intervals in R, for instance.
We further assume that each reviewer has a monotonic function in mind that they use to compute the overall recom-
mendation for a paper from its criteria scores. By a monotonic function, we mean that given any two score vectors x
and x′, if x is greater than or equal to x′ on all coordinates, then the function’s value on x must be at least as high as
its value on x′. Formally, for each reviewer i, there exists g?i ∈ F such that yia = g?i (xia) for all a ∈ P (i), where
F = {f : X→ Y | ∀x,x′ ∈ X,x ≥ x′ ⇒ f(x) ≥ f(x′)}
is the set of all monotonic functions.
2.1 Loss Functions
Recall that our goal is to use all criteria scores, and their corresponding overall recommendations, to learn an aggregate
function f̂ that captures the opinions of all reviewers on how criteria scores should be mapped to recommendations. We
do this by computing the function in F that minimizes the L(p, q) loss on the data. In more detail, given p, q ∈ [1,∞],
we compute
f̂ ∈ argmin
f∈F

∑
i∈R
 ∑
a∈P (i)
|yia − f(xia)|p

q
p

1
q
. (1)
In words, for a function f , the L(p, q) loss is the Lq norm taken over the loss associated with individual reviewers,
where the latter loss is defined as the Lp norm computed on the error of f with respect to the reviewer’s overall
recommendations. This definition closely resembles the L(p, q) norm of a matrix, which has many applications in
machine learning (Ding et al. 2006; Kong, Ding, and Huang 2011; Nie et al. 2010). We refer to aggregation by
minimizing L(p, q) loss as defined in Equation (1) as L(p, q) aggregation.
Equation (1) does not specify how to break ties between multiple minimizers. For concreteness, we select the
minimizer f̂ with minimum empirical L2 norm. Mathematically, let
F̂ = argmin
f∈F

∑
i∈R
 ∑
a∈P (i)
|yia − f(xia)|p

q
p

1
q
be the set of all L(p, q) loss minimizers. We break ties by choosing
f̂ ∈ argmin
f∈F̂
√∑
i∈R
∑
a∈P (i)
f(xia)2. (2)
Observe that since the L(p, q) loss and constraint set are convex, F̂ is also a convex set. Hence, f̂ as defined by
Equation (2) is unique. We emphasize that although we use minimum L2 norm for tie-breaking, all of our results hold
under any reasonable tie-breaking method, such as the minimum Lk norm for any k ∈ (1,∞).
Once the function f̂ has been computed, it can be applied to every review (for all reviewers i and papers a) to obtain
a new overall recommendation f̂(xia). There is a separate — almost orthogonal — question of how to aggregate
the overall recommendations of several reviewers on a paper into a single recommendation (typically this is done by
taking the average). In our theoretical results we are agnostic to how this additional aggregation step is performed, but
we return to it in our experiments in Section 4.
We remark that an alternative approach would be to learn a monotonic function ĝi : X → Y for each reviewer
(which best captures their recommendations), and then aggregate these functions into a single function f̂ . We chose
not to pursue this approach, because in practice there are very few examples per reviewer, so it is implausible that we
would be able to accurately learn the reviewers’ individual functions.
2.2 Axiomatic Properties
In social choice theory, the most common approach — primarily attributed to Arrow (1951) — for comparing different
aggregation methods is to determine which desirable axioms they satisfy. We take the same approach in order to
determine the values of p and q for the L(p, q) aggregation in Equation (1).
We stress that axioms are defined for aggregation methods and not aggregate functions. Informally, an aggregation
method is a function that takes as input all the reviews {(xia, yia)}i∈R,a∈P (i), and outputs an aggregate function
f̂ : X → Y. We do not define an aggregation method formally to avoid introducing cumbersome notation that will
largely be useless later. It is clear that for any p, q ∈ [1,∞], L(p, q) aggregation (with tie-breaking as defined by
Equation 2) is an aggregation method.
Social choice theory essentially relies on counterfactual reasoning to identify scenarios where it is clear how an
aggregation method should behave. To give one example, the Pareto efficiency property of voting rules states that if all
voters prefer alternative a to alternative b, then b should not be elected; this situation is extremely unlikely to occur,
yet Pareto efficiency is obviously a property that any reasonable voting must satisfy. With this principle in mind, we
identify a setting in our problem where the requirements are very clear, and then define our axioms in that setting.
For all of our axioms, we restrict attention to scenarios where every reviewer reviews every paper, that is, P (i) = P
for every i. Moreover, we assume that the papers have ‘objective’ criteria scores, that is, the criteria scores given to a
paper are the same across all reviewers, so the only source of disagreement is how the criteria scores should be mapped
to an overall recommendation. We can then denote the criteria scores of a paper a simply as xa, as opposed to xia,
since they are independent of i.
An axiom is satisfied by an aggregation method if its statement holds for every possible number of reviewers n
and number of papers m, and for all possible criteria scores and overall recommendations. We start with the simplest
axiom, consensus, which informally states that if there is a paper such that all reviewers give it the same overall
recommendation, then f̂ must agree with the reviewers; this axiom is closely related to the unanimity axiom in social
choice.
Axiom 1 (Consensus). For any paper a ∈ P , if all reviewers report identical overall recommendations y1a = y2a =
· · · = yma = r for some r ∈ Y, then f̂(xa) = r.
Before presenting the next axiom, we require another definition: we say that paper a ∈ P dominates paper b ∈ P
if there exists a bijection σ : R → R such that for all i ∈ R, yia ≥ yσ(i)b. Equivalently (and less formally),
paper a dominates paper b if the sorted overall recommendations given to a pointwise-dominate the sorted overall
recommendations given to b. Intuitively, in this situation, a should receive a (weakly) higher overall recommendation
than b, which is exactly what the axiom requires; it is similar to the classic Pareto efficiency axiom mentioned above.
Axiom 2 (Efficiency). For any pair of papers a, b ∈ P , if a dominates b, then f̂(xa) ≥ f̂(xb).
Our final axiom is strategyproofness, a game-theoretic property that plays a major role in social choice the-
ory (Moulin 1983). Intuitively, strategyproofness means that reviewers have no incentive to misreport their overall
recommendations: They cannot bring the aggregate recommendations — the community’s consensus about the rela-
tive importance of various criteria — closer to their own through strategic manipulation.
Axiom 3 (Strategyproofness). For each reviewer i ∈ R, and all possible manipulated recommendations y′i ∈ Ym, if
yi = (yi1, yi2, . . . , yim) is replaced with y′i, then
‖(f̂(x1), . . . , f̂(xm))− yi‖2 ≤ ‖(ĝ(x1), . . . , ĝ(xm))− yi‖2, (3)
where f̂ and ĝ are the aggregate functions obtained from the original and manipulated reviews, respectively.
The implicit ‘utilities’ in this axiom (3) are defined in terms of the L2 norm. This choice is made only for concrete-
ness, and all our results hold for any norm L`, ` ∈ [1,∞], in the definition (3).
3 Theoretical Results
In Section 2 we introduced L(p, q) aggregation as a family of rules for aggregating individual opinions towards a
consensus mapping from criteria scores to recommendations. But that definition, in and of itself, leaves open the
question of how to choose the values of p and q in a way that leads to the most socially desirable outcomes. The
axioms of Section 2.2 allow us to give a satisfying answer to this question. Specifically, our main theoretical result is
a characterization of L(p, q) aggregation in terms of the three axioms.
Theorem 1. L(p, q) aggregation, where p, q ∈ [1,∞], satisfies consensus, efficiency, and strategyproofness if and
only if p = q = 1.
We remark that for p = q, Equation (1) does not distinguish between different reviewers, that is, the aggregation
method pools all reviews together. We find this interesting, because the L(p, q) aggregation framework does have
enough power to make that distinction, but the axioms guide us towards a specific solution, L(1, 1), which does not.
Turning to the proof of the theorem, in a nutshell, we establish the ‘only if’ direction in three steps: strategyproofness
is violated by L(p, q) aggregation for all q > 1 (Lemma 1), consensus is violated by p = ∞ and q = 1 (Lemma 2),
and efficiency is violated by p ∈ (1,∞) and q = 1 (Lemma 3). Together, the three lemmas leave p = q = 1 as the only
option, and, for the ‘if’ direction, Lemma 4 then shows that L(1, 1) aggregation does indeed satisfy the three axioms.
Below we state the lemmas and give some proof ideas; the theorem’s full proof is relegated to Appendix A.
Lemma 1. L(p, q) aggregation with q ∈ (1,∞] violates strategyproofness.
We prove the lemma via a simple construction with just one paper and two reviewers, who give the paper overall
recommendations of 1 and 0, respectively. For q ∈ (1,∞), the aggregate score is
f̂ = argmin
f∈R
{
|1− f |q + |f |q
}
,
and for q =∞, it is
f̂ = argmin
f∈R
max
(|1− f |, |f |).
Either way, the unique minimum is obtained at an aggregate score of 0.5. If reviewer 1 reported an overall recommen-
dation of 2, however, the aggregate score would be 1, which matches her ‘true’ recommendation, thereby violating
strategyproofness.
Lemma 2. L(p, q) aggregation with p =∞ and q = 1 violates consensus.
Lemma 2 is established via another simple construction: two papers, two reviewers, and overall recommendations
y =
[
0 1
2 1
]
,
where yia denotes the overall recommendation given by reviewer i to paper a. Crucially, the two reviewers agree on
an overall recommendation of 1 for paper 2, hence the aggregate score of this paper must also be 1. But we show that
L(∞, 1) aggregation would not return an aggregate score of 1 for paper 2.
In our view, the next lemma presents the most interesting and counter-intuitive result in the paper.
Lemma 3. L(p, q) aggregation with p ∈ (1,∞) and q = 1 violates efficiency.
It is quite surprising that such reasonable loss functions violate the simple requirement of efficiency. In what follows
we attempt to explain this phenomenon via a connection of our problem with the notion of the ‘Fermat point’ of a
triangle (Spain 1996). The explanation provided here demonstrates the negative result for L(2, 1) aggregation. The
complete proof of the lemma for general values of p ∈ (1,∞) is quite involved, and is relegated to Appendix A.
Consider a setting with 3 reviewers and 2 papers, where each reviewer reviews both papers. We let x1 and x2 denote
the respective objective criteria scores of the two papers. Assume that no score in {x1,x2} is pointwise greater than
or equal to the other score in that set. Let the overall recommendations given by the reviewers be y11 = z, y21 = 0,
y31 = 0 to the first paper and y12 = 0, y22 = 1 and y23 = 0 to the second paper. Under these scores, let f̂ denote the
aggregate function that minimizes the L(2, 1) loss.
The Fermat point of a triangle is a point such that the sum of its (Euclidean) distances from all three vertices
is minimized. Consider a triangle in R2 with vertices (z, 0), (0, 1) and (0, 0). Setting z = 2, one can use known
algorithms to compute the Fermat point of this triangle as (0.25, 0.30). More generally, when the vertex (z, 0) is
moved away from the rest of the triangle (by increasing z), the Fermat point paradoxically biases towards the other
(second) coordinate.
Connecting back to our original problem, by definition, the Fermat point of this triangle is exactly (f̂(x1), f̂(x2)).
When z = 2, paper 1 receives scores (2, 0, 0) in sorted order, which dominates the sorted scores (1, 0, 0) of paper
2. However the aggregate score f̂(x1) = 0.25 of paper 1 is strictly smaller than f̂(x2) = 0.30 of paper 2, thereby
violating efficiency for the L(2, 1) loss.
Finally, we now turn to the positive result.
Lemma 4. L(p, q) aggregation with p = q = 1 satisfies consensus, efficiency and strategyproofness.
When each reviewer reviews every paper and the papers have objective criteria scores, L(1, 1) aggregation, with
tie-breaking as in Equation (2), satisfies
f̂(xa) = left-med({yia}i∈R) ∀a ∈ P,
where left-med(·) of a set of points in R is their left median. Using this observation, we can show that all three
properties are satisfied, thereby proving Lemma 4.
It is worth noting that, although we have presented the lemmas as components in the proof of Theorem 1, they also
have standalone value (some more than others). For example, if one decided that only strategyproofness is important,
then Lemma 1 would give significant guidance on choosing an appropriate method.
4 Implementation and Experimental Results
In order to empirically analyze different aspects of our approach, we employ a dataset of reviews from the 26th In-
ternational Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI 2017), which was made available to us by the program
chair, Carles Sierra. To our knowledge, we are the first to use this dataset.
At submission time, authors were asked if review data for their paper could be included in an anonymized dataset,
and, similarly, reviewers were asked whether their reviews could be included; the dataset provided to us consists of all
reviews for which permission was given. Each review is tagged with a reviewer ID and paper ID, which are anonymized
for privacy reasons. The criteria used in the conference are ‘originality’, ‘relevance’, ‘significance’, ‘quality of writing’
(which we call ‘writing’), and ‘technical quality’ (which we call ‘technical’), and each is rated on a scale from 1 to 10.
Overall recommendations are also on a scale from 1 to 10. In addition, information about which papers were accepted
and which were rejected is included in the dataset.
The number of papers in the dataset is 2380, of which 649 were accepted, which amounts to 27.27%. This is a
large subset of the 2540 submissions to the conference, of which 660 were accepted, for an actual acceptance rate of
# of reviews per paper 2 3 4 5 6
Frequency 2 485 1734 152 7
Table 1: Distribution of number of reviews per paper
# of reviews by a reviewer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 ≥ 9
Frequency 238 96 92 120 146 211 628 187 7
Table 2: Distribution of number of papers reviewed by a reviewer
1 2 3 4 5
Number of reviews per paper (k)
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Ov
er
la
p 
ag
ai
ns
t a
ll 
re
vi
ew
s
Figure 1: Fraction overlap as number of reviews per paper is restricted
25.98%. The number of reviewers in the dataset is 1725, and the number of reviews is 9197. Tables 1 and 2 show the
distribution of the number of reviews received by papers, and the number of papers reviewed by reviewers.
We apply L(1, 1) aggregation (i.e., p = q = 1), as given in Equation (1), to this dataset to learn the aggregate func-
tion. Let us denote that function by f˜ . The optimization problem in Equation (1) is convex, and standard optimization
packages can efficiently compute the minimizer. Hence, importantly, computational complexity is a nonissue in terms
of implementing our approach.
Once we compute the aggregate function f˜ , we calculate the aggregate overall recommendation of each paper a by
taking the median of the aggregate reviewer scores for that paper obtained by applying f˜ to the objective scores:
yf˜ (a) = median({f˜(xia)}i∈R) ∀a ∈ P. (4)
Recalling that 27.27% of the papers in the dataset were actually accepted to the conference, in our experiments we
define the set of papers accepted by the aggregate function f˜ as the the top 27.27% of papers according to their
respective yf˜ values.
We now present the specific experiments we ran, and their results.
4.1 Varying Number of Reviewers
In our first experiment, for each value of a parameter k ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, we subsampled k distinct reviews for each paper
uniformly at random from the set of all reviews for that paper (if the paper had fewer than k to begin with then we
retained all the reviews). We then computed an aggregate function, f̂k, via L(1, 1) aggregation applied only to these
subsampled reviews. Next, we found the set of top 27.27% papers as given by f̂k applied to the subsampled reviews.
Finally, we compared the overlap of this set of top papers for every value of k with the set of top 27.27% papers as
dictated by the overall aggregate function f˜ .
The results from this experiment are plotted in Figure 1, and lead to several observations. First, the incremental
overlap from k = 4 to 5 is very small because there are a very few papers that had 5 or more reviews (Table 1).
Second, we see that the amount of overlap monotonically increases with the number of reviewers per paper k, thereby
serving as a sanity check on the data as well as our methods. Third, we observe the overlap to be quite high (≈ 60%)
even with a single reviewer per paper.
4.2 Loss Per Reviewer
Next, we look at the loss of different reviewers, under f˜ (obtained by L(1, 1) aggregation). In order for the losses to
be on the same scale, we normalize each reviewer’s loss by the number of papers reviewed by them. Formally, the
normalized loss of reviewer i (for p = 1) is
1
|P (i)|
∑
a∈P (i)
|yia − f˜(xia)|.
The normalized loss averaged across reviewers is found to be 0.470, and the standard deviation is 0.382. Figure 2
shows the distribution of the normalized loss of all the reviewers. Note that the normalized loss of a reviewer can fall
in the range [0, 9]. These results thus indicate that the function f˜ is indeed at least a reasonable representation of the
mapping of the broader community.
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Figure 2: Frequency of losses of the reviewers for L(1, 1) aggregation, normalized by the number of papers reviewed
by the respective reviewers
4.3 Visualizing the Community Aggregate Mapping
Our framework is not only useful for computing an aggregate mapping to help in acceptance decisions, but also
for understanding the preferences of the community for use in subsequent modeling and research. We illustrate this
application by providing some visualizations and interpretations of the aggregate function f˜ obtained from L(1, 1)
aggregation on the IJCAI review data.
The function f˜ lives in a 5-dimensional space, making it hard to visualize the entire aggregate function at once.
Hence we instead fix the values of 3 criteria at a time and plot the function in terms of the remaining two criteria. In all
of the visualization and interpretation below, the fixed criteria are set to their respective (marginal) modes: For ‘quality
of writing’ the mode is 7 (715 reviews), for ‘originality’ it is 6 (826 reviews), for ‘relevance’ it is 8 (888 reviews),
for ‘significance’ it is 5 (800 reviews), and for ‘technical quality’ it is 6 (702 reviews). We present the three most
representative plots in Figure 3, and relegate the rest to Appendix B.
The key takeaways from this experiment are as follows:
• Writing and relevance do not have a significant influence (Figure 3(a)). Really bad writing or relevance is a signifi-
cant downside, excellent writing or relevance is appreciated, but everything else in between in irrelevant.
• Technical quality and significance exert a high influence (Figure 3(b)). Moreover, the influence is approximately
linear.
• Originality exerts a moderate influence (Figure 3(c)).
• Linear models (i.e., models that are linear in the criteria) are quite popular in machine learning. Our empirical
observations reveal that linear models are partially applicable to conference review data — for some criteria one
may indeed assume a linear model, but not for all.
4.4 Overlaps with Other Aggregates
We also compute the overlap between the set of top 27.27% papers selected by L(1, 1) aggregation f˜ with the actual
top 27.27% accepted papers. It is important to emphasize that we believe the set of papers selected by our method is
better than any hand-crafted or rule-based decision using the scores, since this aggregate represents the opinion of the
community. Hence, to be clear, we do not have a goal of maximizing the overlap. Nevertheless, a very small overlap
would mean that our approach is drastically different from standard practice, which would potentially be disturbing. We
find that the overlap is 79.2%, which we think is quite fascinating — our approach does make a significant difference,
but the difference is not so drastic as to be disconcerting.
Finally, out of intellectual curiosity, we also computed the pairwise overlaps of the papers accepted by L(p, q)
aggregation, for p, q ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We find that, interestingly, the choice of the reviewer-norm q has significantly more
influence as compared to the paper-norm p; we refer the reader to Appendix B for details.
5 Discussion
A primary challenge in the analysis of peer review is the absence of ground truth. This challenge is compounded by
the paucity of models for problems such as subjective mappings. We address these challenges by leveraging tools from
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(a) Varying ‘quality of writing’ and ‘relevance’
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(b) Varying ‘significance’ and ‘technical quality’
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(c) Varying ‘originality’ and ‘relevance’
Figure 3: Influence of the different criteria under in the L(1, 1) aggregate.
social choice theory and taking an axiomatic viewpoint, and then making only the weak assumption that the mapping
for any reviewer is monotonic.
In particular, one can think of the theoretical results of Section 3 as supporting L(1, 1) aggregation using the tools
of social choice theory, whereas the empirical results of Section 4 focus on studying its behavior on real data (as well
as phenomena related to the data itself). Understanding this helps clear up another possible source of confusion: are
we not overfitting by training on a set of reviews, and then applying the aggregate function to the same reviews? The
answer is negative, because the process of learning the function f̂ amounts to an aggregation of opinions about how
criteria scores should be mapped to overall recommendations. Applying it to the data yields recommendations in Y,
whereas this function from X to Y lives in a different space.
That said, it is of intellectual interest to understand the statistical aspects of estimating the community’s consen-
sus mapping function, assuming the existence of a ground truth. In more detail, suppose that each reviewer’s true
function g?i is a noisy version of some underlying function f
?? that represents the community’s beliefs. Then can
L(1, 1) aggregation recover the function f?? (in the statistical consistency sense)? If so, then with what sample com-
plexity? At a conceptual level, this non-parametric estimation problem is closely related to problems in isotonic re-
gression (Shah et al. 2016; Gao and Wellner 2007; Chatterjee, Guntuboyina, and Sen 2018). The key difference is
that the observations in our setting consist of evaluations of multiple functions, where each such function is a noisy
version of the original monotonic function. In contrast, isotonic regression is primarily concerned with noisy evalua-
tions of a common function. Nevertheless, the insights from isotonic regression suggest that the naturally occurring
monotonicity assumption of our setting can yield attractive — and sometimes near-parametric (Shah et al. 2016;
Shah, Balakrishnan, and Wainwright 2018) — rates of estimation.
Finally, our work focuses on learning one representative aggregate mapping for the entire community of reviewers.
Instead, the program chairs of a conference may wish to allow for multiple mappings that represent the aggregate opin-
ions of different sub-communities (e.g., theoretical or applied researchers). In this case, one can modify our framework
to also learn this (unknown) partition of reviewers and/or papers into multiple sub-communities with different map-
ping functions, and frame the problem in terms of learning a mixture model. The design of computationally efficient
algorithms for L(p, q) aggregation under such a mixture model is a challenging open problem.
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Appendix
A Proof Of Theorem 1
Recall that the proof of Theorem 1 is comprised of four lemmas, three for the ‘only if’ direction, and one for the ‘if’
direction. We give the proofs of these lemmas below.
A.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider L(p, q) aggregation with arbitrary q ∈ (1,∞]. We show that strategyproofness is violated. The construction
for this is as follows. Suppose there is one paper a and two reviewers. The first reviewer gives the paper an overall
recommendation of 1 and the second reviewer gives it an overall recommendation of 0. Let xa be the (objective)
criteria scores of this paper.
Let us first consider q ∈ (1,∞). For a function f : X → Y, all we care about in this example is its value at xa.
Hence, for simplicity, let fa denote the value of function f at xa, i.e, fa := f(xa). Then our aggregation becomes
f̂a = argmin
fa∈R
{
|1− fa|q + |fa|q
}
.
We claim that fa = 0.5 is the unique minimizer. Observe that if fa = 0.5, then the value of our objective is
0.5q + 0.5q < 1 when q ∈ (1,∞). On the other hand, if fa ≥ 1 or if fa ≤ 0 then the value of our objective is at
least 1. Hence fa ∈ (0, 1). By symmetry, we can restrict attention to the range [0.5, 1) since if there is a minimizer in
(0, 0.5) then there must also be a minimizer in (0.5, 1). Consequently, we rewrite the optimization problem as
f̂a = argmin
fa∈[0.5,1)
{
(1− fa)q + fqa
}
. (5)
Consider the function h : [0.5, 1]→ R defined by h(x) = xq . This function is strictly convex (the second derivative
is strictly positive in the domain) whenever q ∈ (1,∞). Hence from the definition of strict convexity, we have
0.5
(
(1− fa)q + fqa
)
>
(
0.5(1− fa + fa)
)q
= 0.5q
whenever fa ∈ (0.5, 1). Consequently, the objective value of (5) is greater at fa ∈ (0.5, 1) than at fa = 0.5. We
conclude that f̂a = 0.5 whenever q ∈ (1,∞).
When q =∞, we equivalently write the optimization problem as
f̂a = argmin
fa∈R
max
(|1− fa|, |fa|).
This objective has a value of 0.5 if fa = 0.5 and strictly greater if fa 6= 0.5. Hence, f̂a = 0.5 for q =∞ as well.
The true overall recommendation of reviewer 1 differs from the aggregate f̂a by 0.5 (in every L` norm). However, if
reviewer 1 reported an overall recommendation of 2, then an argument identical to that above shows that the minimizer
is ĝa = 1. Reviewer 1 has thus successfully brought down the difference between her own true overall recommendation
and the aggregate ĝa to 0. We conclude that strategyproofness is violated whenever q ∈ (1,∞].
A.2 Proof of Lemma 2
The construction showing that L(∞, 1) aggregation violates consensus is as follows. Suppose there are two papers,
two reviewers and both reviewers review both papers. Assume that the papers have objective criteria scores x1 and x2,
and that neither of these scores is pointwise greater than or equal to the other. Let the overall recommendations of the
reviewers for the papers be given by the matrix
y =
[
0 1
2 1
]
,
where yia denotes the overall recommendation of reviewer i for paper a. Since both reviewers give the same overall
recommendation of 1 to paper 2, any aggregation method that satisfies consensus must also give paper 2 an aggregate
score of 1. We show that this is not the case under L(∞, 1) aggregation.
Let fi denote the value of function f on paper i, i.e. fi := f(xi). And let f̂i denote the aggregate score of paper i.
Since we are minimizing L(∞, 1) loss, the aggregate function satisfies:
(f̂1, f̂2) ∈ argmin
(f1,f2)∈R2
{∥∥(0, 1)− (f1, f2)∥∥∞ + ∥∥(2, 1)− (f1, f2)∥∥∞}. (6)
We do not have any monotonicity constraints in (6) because the two papers have incomparable criteria scores. Denote
the objective function of (6) by G(f1, f2). We can simplify this objective to
G(f1, f2) = max(|f1|, |f2 − 1|) + max(|2− f1|, |f2 − 1|). (7)
We claim that (0.5, 0.5) is a minimizer of G. The objective function value at this point is
G(0.5, 0.5) = max(0.5, 0.5) + max(1.5, 0.5) = 0.5 + 1.5 = 2.
For arbitrary (f1, f2) ∈ R2, we have
G(f1, f2) = max(|f1|, |f2 − 1|) + max(|2− f1|, |f2 − 1|)
≥ |f1|+ |2− f1|
≥ 2 = G(0.5, 0.5),
where the first inequality holds because the maximum of two elements is always larger than the first, and the second
inequality holds by the triangle inequality. Therefore, (0.5, 0.5) is a minimizer of G. The L2 norm of this minimizer
is 0.5
√
2 < 1. On the other hand, any minimizer (f̂1, f̂2) with f̂2 = 1 would have an L2 norm of at least 1. It follows
that such a minimizer will not be selected. In other words, L(∞, 1) aggregation would select a minimizer for which
the aggregate score of paper 2 is not 1, violating consensus.2
Complete picture of minimizers. For completeness, we look at the set of all minimizers of G. This is given by
F̂ =
{
(f1, f2) | f1 ∈ [0, 2], f2 ∈ [1−min(f1, 2− f1), 1 + min(f1, 2− f1)]
}
.
Pictorially, this set is given by the shaded square in Figure 4. It is the square with vertices at (0, 1), (1, 0), (2, 1) and
(1, 2).
0 1 2
0
1
2
Figure 4: The shaded region depicts the set of all minimizers of (6). f1 is on the x-axis and f2 is on the y-axis.
This shows that almost all minimizers violate consensus. For the specific tie-breaking considered, the minimizer
chosen is the one with minimum L2 norm, i.e., the projection of (0, 0) onto this square. This gives us (0.5, 0.5),
violating consensus.
Observe that tie-breaking using minimumLk norm, for k ∈ (1,∞], also chooses (0.5, 0.5) as the aggregate function,
violating consensus. For k = 1, all points on the line segment f1 + f2 = 1 (0 ≤ f1 ≤ 1) would be tied winners,
almost all of which violate consensus. Further, even if one uses other reasonable tie-breaking schemes like maximum
Lk norm, they suffer from the same issue, i.e., there is a tied winner which violates consensus.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 3
Consider L(p, 1) aggregation with an arbitrary p ∈ (1,∞). We show that efficiency is violated. The construction for
this is as follows. There are 2 papers, 3 reviewers and each reviewer reviews both papers. Assume that the papers have
2Observe that even if we used any Lk norm with k ∈ (1,∞) for tie-breaking, the Lk norm of (0.5, 0.5) would be 0.5 k
√
2 < 1,
while the Lk norm of any minimizer (f̂1, 1) would still be at least 1, violating consensus.
objective criteria scores x1 and x2, and that neither of these scores is pointwise greater than or equal to the other. Let
the overall recommendations by the reviewers for the papers be defined by the matrix
y =
[
z 0
0 1
0 0
]
,
where z is a constant strictly bigger than 1 and yia denotes the overall recommendation by reviewer i to paper a.
Observe that paper 1 dominates paper 2. But, we will show that there exists a value z > 1 such that the aggregate score
of paper 1 is strictly smaller than the aggregate score of paper 2.
Let fi denote the value of function f on paper i, i.e. fi := f(xi). And let f̂i(z) denote the aggregate score of paper
i; observe that we write it as a function of z because the aggregate score of each paper would depend on the chosen
score z. Since we are minimizing L(p, 1) loss, the aggregate function satisfies:
(f̂1(z), f̂2(z)) ∈ argmin
(f1,f2)∈R2
{∥∥(z, 0)− (f1, f2)∥∥p + ∥∥(0, 1)− (f1, f2)∥∥p + ∥∥(f1, f2)∥∥p}. (8)
We do not have any monotonicity constraints in (8) because the two papers have incomparable criteria scores. For
simplicity, let f := (f1, f2), f̂(z) := (f̂1(z), f̂2(z)), and denote the objective function in Equation (8) by Gz(f). That
is,
Gz(f1, f2) =
[
|z − f1|p + |f2|p
] 1
p
+
[
|f1|p + |1− f2|p
] 1
p
+
[
|f1|p + |f2|p
] 1
p
. (9)
For the overall proof to be easier to follow, proofs of all claims are given at the end of this proof. Also, just to re-
emphasize, the whole proof assumes z > 1.
Claim 1. Gz is a strictly convex objective function.
Claim 1 states that Gz is strictly convex, implying that it has a unique minimizer f̂(z). Hence, there is no need to
consider tie-breaking.
Claim 2. f̂1(z) and f̂2(z) are bounded. In particular, f̂1(z) ∈ [0, 1] and f̂2(z) ∈ [0, 1].
Claim 2 states that the aggregate score of both papers lies in the interval [0, 1] irrespective of the value of z. This
allow us to restrict ourselves to the region [0, 1]2 when computing the minimizer of (9). Hence, for the rest of the
proof, we only consider the space [0, 1]2. In this region, the optimization problem (8) can be rewritten as
(f̂1(z), f̂2(z)) = argmin
f1∈[0,1],f2∈[0,1]
{[(
z − f1
)p
+ fp2
] 1
p
+
[
fp1 +
(
1− f2
)p] 1p
+
[
fp1 + f
p
2
] 1
p
}
.
To start off, we analyze the objective function as we take the limit of z going to infinity. Later, we show that the
observed property holds even for a sufficiently large finite z.
For the limit to exist, redefine the objective function as Hz(f1, f2) = Gz(f1, f2)−Gz(0, 0), i.e.,
Hz(f1, f2) =
[(
z − f1
)p
+ fp2
] 1
p − z +
[
fp1 +
(
1− f2
)p] 1p
+
[
fp1 + f
p
2
] 1
p − 1. (10)
For any value of z, the function Hz has the same minimizer as Gz , that is,
(f̂1(z), f̂2(z)) = argmin
f1∈[0,1],f2∈[0,1]
Hz(f1, f2).
Claim 3. For any (fixed) f1 ∈ [0, 1], f2 ∈ [0, 1],
lim
z→∞Hz(f1, f2) = H
?(f1, f2),
where
H?(f1, f2) = −f1 +
[
fp1 +
(
1− f2
)p] 1p
+
[
fp1 + f
p
2
] 1
p − 1. (11)
The proof proceeds by analyzing some important properties of the limiting function H?.
Claim 4. The function H?(f) is convex in f ∈ [0, 1]2. Moreover, the function H?(f) is strictly convex for f1 ∈ (0, 1]
and f2 ∈ [0, 1].
Claim 5. H? is minimized at v̂ = (v̂1, v̂2), where
v̂1 =
1
2
[
1
(2
p
p−1 − 1)
] 1
p
, v̂2 =
1
2
. (12)
Claim 6. v̂1 < v̂2.
Observe that Claim 6 is the desired result, but for the limiting objective function H?. The remainder of the proof
proceeds to show that this result holds even for the objective function Hz , when the score z is large enough. Define
∆ = v̂2 − v̂1 > 0. We first show that (i) there exists z > 1 such that ‖f̂(z)− v̂‖2 < ∆4 , and then (ii) show that in this
case, we have f̂1(z) < f̂2(z).
To prove part (i), we first analyze how functionsHz andH? relate to each other. Using Claim 3, for any fixed f1, f2,
by definition of the limit, for any  > 0, there exists z (which could be a function of f1, f2) such that, for all z > z,
we have
|Hz(f1, f2)−H?(f1, f2)| < . (13)
For a given f1, f2, denote the corresponding value of z by z(f1, f2). And, let Z(f1, f2) denote the set of all values
of z > 1 for which Equation (13) holds for (f1, f2).
Claim 7. Z(1, 1) ⊂ Z(f1, f2) for every (f1, f2) ∈ [0, 1]2.
Claim 7 says that if Equation (13) holds for a particular value of z for f1 = f2 = 1, then for the same value of z it
holds for every other value of (f1, f2) ∈ [0, 1]2 as well. So, define
z˜ := z(1, 1) + 1. (14)
By definition, z˜ ∈ Z(1, 1). And by Claim 7, z˜ ∈ Z(f1, f2) for every (f1, f2) ∈ [0, 1]2. So, set z = z˜. Then, Equa-
tion (13) holds for all (f1, f2) ∈ [0, 1]2 simultaneously. In other words, for all (f1, f2) ∈ [0, 1]2, we simultaneously
have
H?(f1, f2)−  < Hz(f1, f2) < H?(f1, f2) + , (15)
i.e. Hz is in an -band around H? throughout this region. And observe that this band gets smaller as  is decreased
(which is achieved at a larger value of z).
To bound the distance between v̂, the minimizer of H?, and f̂(z), the minimizer of Hz , we bound the distance
between the objective function values at these points.
Claim 8. H?(f̂(z)) < H?(v̂) + 2.
Although f̂(z) does not minimize H?, Claim 8 says that the objective value at f̂(z) cannot be more than 2 larger
than its minimum, H?(v̂). We use this to bound the distance between f̂(z) and the minimizer v̂. Observe that f̂(z)
falls in the [H?(v̂) + 2]-level set of H?. So, we next look at a specific level set of H?.
Define
τ := min
f∈[0,1]2:‖f−v̂‖2= ∆4
H?(f). (16)
Observe that a minimum exists (infimum is not required) for the minimization in (16) because we are minimizing over
the closed set {f ∈ [0, 1]2 : ‖f − v̂‖2 = ∆4 } and H? is continuous.
For any fixed p ∈ (1,∞), Equation (12) shows that v̂1 is bounded away from 0. Hence, Claim 4 shows that H?
is strictly convex at and in the region around v̂. Further, H? is convex everywhere else. Coupling this with the fact
that (16) minimizes along points not arbitrarily close to the minimizer v̂, we have τ > H?(v̂).
Define the level set of H? with respect to τ :
Cτ = {f ∈ [0, 1]2 : H?(f) ≤ τ}.
Claim 9. For every f ∈ Cτ , we have ‖f − v̂‖2 ≤ ∆4 .
Define o :=
τ−H?(v̂)
2 , and set  = o. Then, set z = z˜o as before. Applying Claim 8, we obtain
H?(f̂(z˜o)) < H
?(v̂) + 2o = τ.
In other words, f̂(z˜o) ∈ Cτ . And applying Claim 9, we obtain ‖f̂(z˜o)− v̂‖2 ≤ ∆4 , completing part (i).
This implies that ‖f̂(z˜o)− v̂‖∞ ≤ ∆4 , which means∣∣∣f̂1(z˜o)− v̂1∣∣∣ ≤ ∆4 and ∣∣∣f̂2(z˜o)− v̂2∣∣∣ ≤ ∆4 . (17)
Using these properties, we have
f̂1(z˜o) ≤ v̂1 +
∆
4
= v̂2 −∆ + ∆
4
≤ f̂2(z˜o) +
∆
4
−∆ + ∆
4
= f̂2(z˜o)−
∆
2
,
where the first inequality holds because of the first part of (17), the equality holds because ∆ = v̂2− v̂1 and the second
inequality holds because of the second part of (17). Therefore, for z = z˜o > 1, the aggregate scores of the two papers
are such that
f̂1(z˜o) < f̂2(z˜o),
violating efficiency.
Proof of Claim 1. Take arbitrary f ,g ∈ R2 with f 6= g, and let θ ∈ (0, 1). We show that Gz(θf + (1 − θ)g) <
θGz(f) + (1 − θ)Gz(g). For this, we will first show that either (i) [(z, 0) − f ] is not parallel to [(z, 0) − g], (ii)
[(0, 1)− f ] is not parallel to [(0, 1)− g] or (iii) f is not parallel to g. For the sake of contradiction, assume that this is
not true. That is, assume [(z, 0)− f ] is parallel to [(z, 0)− g], [(0, 1)− f ] is parallel to [(0, 1)− g], and f is parallel to
g. This implies that[
z − f1
−f2
]
= r
[
z − g1
−g2
]
,
[ −f1
1− f2
]
= s
[ −g1
1− g2
]
and
[
f1
f2
]
= t
[
g1
g2
]
,
where r, s, t ∈ R 3. Note that, none of r, s, t can be 1 because f 6= g. The second equation tells us that f1 = sg1 and
the third one tells us that f1 = tg1. So, either f1 = g1 = 0 or s = t. But from the first equation, z − f1 = rz − rg1.
So if f1 = g1 = 0, it says that r = 1 which is not possible. Therefore, s = t. The third equation now tells us that
f2 = tg2 = sg2. But, the second equation gives us 1 − f2 = s − sg2, which implies that s = 1. But again this is not
possible, leading to a contradiction. Therefore, at least one of (i), (ii) and (iii) is true.
Lp norm with p ∈ (1,∞) is a convex norm, i.e. for any x, y ∈ R2,
‖θx+ (1− θ)y‖p ≤ θ‖x‖p + (1− θ)‖y‖p. (18)
Further, since p ∈ (1,∞), the inequality in (18) is strict if x is not parallel to y. For our objective (in Equation (8)),
Gz(θf + (1− θ)g) =
∥∥θ[(z, 0)− f ] + (1− θ)[(z, 0)− g]∥∥
p
+
∥∥θ[(0, 1)− f ] + (1− θ)[(0, 1)− g]∥∥
p
+
∥∥θf + (1− θ)g∥∥
p
. (19)
Because of convexity of the Lp norm, each of the three terms on the RHS of Equation (19) satisfies inequality (18).
Further, because at least one of the pair of vectors in the three terms is not parallel (since either (i), (ii) or (iii) is true),
at least one of them gives us a strict inequality. Therefore we obtain
Gz(θf + (1− θ)g) < θGz(f) + (1− θ)Gz(g).
Proof of Claim 2. The claim has four parts: (i) f̂1(z) ≥ 0, (ii) f̂1(z) ≤ 1, (iii) f̂2(z) ≥ 0 and (iv) f̂2(z) ≤ 1. Observe
that parts (i), (iii) and (iv) are more intuitive, since they show that the aggregate score of a paper is no higher than the
maximum score given to it, and no lower than the minimum score given to it. Part (ii) on the other hand is stronger;
even though paper 1 has a score of z > 1 given to it, this part shows that f̂1(z) ≤ 1 (which is much tighter than an
upper bound of z, especially when z is large). We prove the simpler parts (i), (iii) and (iv) first.
For the sake of contradiction, suppose f̂1(z) < 0. Then
Gz(f̂1(z), f̂2(z)) =
[
|z − f̂1(z)|p + |f̂2(z)|p
] 1
p
+
[
|f̂1(z)|p + |1− f̂2(z)|p
] 1
p
+
[
|f̂1(z)|p + |f̂2(z)|p
] 1
p
3A boundary case not captured here is when g is exactly one of the points (z, 0), (0, 1) or (0, 0), leading to 1/r, 1/s or 1/t
being zero respectively. But for this case, it is easy to prove that the other two pairs of vectors cannot be parallel unless f = g.
>
[
|z|p + |f̂2(z)|p
] 1
p
+
[
0 + |1− f̂2(z)|p
] 1
p
+
[
0 + |f̂2(z)|p
] 1
p
= Gz(0, f̂2(z)),
contradicting the fact that (f̂1(z), f̂2(z)) is optimal. Therefore, f̂1(z) ≥ 0, completing proof of (i). Similarly, if
f̂2(z) < 0, we can show thatGz(f̂1(z), f̂2(z)) > Gz(f̂1(z), 0), violating optimality. Therefore, f̂2(z) ≥ 0, completing
proof of (iii).
Next, for the sake of contradiction assume that f̂2(z) > 1. Then
Gz(f̂1(z), f̂2(z)) =
[
|z − f̂1(z)|p + |f̂2(z)|p
] 1
p
+
[
|f̂1(z)|p + |1− f̂2(z)|p
] 1
p
+
[
|f̂1(z)|p + |f̂2(z)|p
] 1
p
>
[
|z − f̂1(z)|p + 1
] 1
p
+
[
|f̂1(z)|p + 0
] 1
p
+
[
|f̂1(z)|p + 1
] 1
p
= Gz(f̂1(z), 1),
contradicting the fact that (f̂1(z), f̂2(z)) is optimal. Therefore, we also have f̂2(z) ≤ 1, completing proof of (iv).
Finally, we prove the more non-intuitive part, (ii). Suppose for the sake of contradiction, f̂1(z) > 1. Then,
Gz(f̂1(z), f̂2(z)) =
[
|z − f̂1(z)|p + |f̂2(z)|p
] 1
p
+
[
|f̂1(z)|p + |1− f̂2(z)|p
] 1
p
+
[
|f̂1(z)|p + |f̂2(z)|p
] 1
p
≥ |z − f̂1(z)|+ |f̂1(z)|+ |f̂1(z)|
≥ z + |f̂1(z)|,
where the first inequality comes from the fact that the Lp norm of each vector is at least as high as the absolute value of
its first element, and the second inequality follows from the triangle inequality. Using the assumption that f̂1(z) > 1,
we obtain
Gz(f̂1(z), f̂2(z)) > z + 1 = Gz(0, 0),
contradicting the fact that (f̂1(z), f̂2(z)) is optimal. Therefore, f̂1(z) ≤ 1, completing the proof.
Proof of Claim 3. Take any arbitrary f1 ∈ [0, 1] and f2 ∈ [0, 1]. Subtracting Equations (10) and (11) we obtain
Hz(f1, f2)−H?(f1, f2) =
[(
z − f1
)p
+ fp2
] 1
p − (z − f1). (20)
Observe that since f2 ≥ 0, the RHS of Equation (20) is non-negative. Hence, the equation does not change on using
an absolute value, i.e.,
|Hz(f1, f2)−H?(f1, f2)| =
[(
z − f1
)p
+ fp2
] 1
p − (z − f1). (21)
To prove the required result, we take a small detour and define φ(x) = (xp + fp2 )
1
p − x. We show that φ(x) → 0 as
x→∞. For this, rewrite φ(x) as follows
φ(x) = x
(
1 +
fp2
xp
) 1
p
− x =
(
1 +
fp2
xp
) 1
p − 1
1
x
.
Taking the limit of x to infinity, we have
lim
x→∞φ(x) = limx→∞
(
1 +
fp2
xp
) 1
p − 1
1
x
. (22)
Observe that for both the numerator and denominator in the RHS of Equation (22), we have
lim
x→∞
{(
1 +
fp2
xp
) 1
p
− 1
}
= 0 and lim
x→∞
{
1
x
}
= 0.
Hence, applying L’Hospital’s rule on equation (22) gives us
lim
x→∞φ(x) = limx→∞
− fp2xp+1
(
1 +
fp2
xp
) 1
p−1
− 1x2
= lim
x→∞
{
fp2
xp−1
(
1 +
fp2
xp
) 1
p−1
}
=
[
lim
x→∞
fp2
xp−1
]
∗
[
lim
x→∞
(
1 +
fp2
xp
) 1
p−1
]
= 0 ∗ 1 = 0,
where
[
limx→∞
fp2
xp−1
]
= 0 because p > 1. Hence, we proved the required result, limx→∞ φ(x) = 0. Going back to
Equation (21), we rewrite it as
|Hz(f1, f2)−H?(f1, f2)| =
[(
z − f1
)p
+ fp2
] 1
p − (z − f1) = φ(z − f1).
Taking the limit of z to infinity, we obtain
lim
z→∞ |Hz(f1, f2)−H
?(f1, f2)| = lim
z→∞φ(z − f1) = limt→∞φ(t) = 0, (23)
where the second step follows by setting t = z − f1. Equation (23) implies that
lim
z→∞Hz(f1, f2) = H
?(f1, f2).
Proof of Claim 4. In the region [0, 1]2, using (11), the function H? can be written as
H?(f1, f2) = −f1 + ‖(0, 1)− (f1, f2)‖p + ‖(f1, f2)‖p − 1. (24)
Observe that each term on the RHS of (24) is a convex function of f . Hence, their sum is also convex in f .
The proof of strict convexity closely follows the proof of claim 1. Take arbitrary f ,g ∈ (0, 1] × [0, 1] with f 6= g,
and let θ ∈ (0, 1). We show that H?(θf + (1− θ)g) < θH?(f) + (1− θ)H?(g). For this, we will first show that either
(i) [(0, 1)− f ] is not parallel to [(0, 1)− g] or (ii) f is not parallel to g. For the sake of contradiction, assume that this
is not true. That is, assume [(0, 1)− f ] is parallel to [(0, 1)− g], and f is parallel to g. This implies that[ −f1
1− f2
]
= r
[ −g1
1− g2
]
and
[
f1
f2
]
= s
[
g1
g2
]
,
where r, s ∈ R. Note that, neither r nor s can be 1 because f 6= g. The first equation tells us that f1 = rg1 and the
second one tells us that f1 = sg1. And since g1 6= 0, this implies that r = s. The second part of the second equation
now tells us that f2 = sg2 = rg2. The second part of the first equation becomes 1− f2 = r − rg2 which implies that
r = 1, leading to a contradiction. Therefore, at least one of (i) and (ii) is true.
Recall, Lp norm with p ∈ (1,∞) is a convex norm, i.e. for any x, y ∈ R2,
‖θx+ (1− θ)y‖p ≤ θ‖x‖p + (1− θ)‖y‖p. (25)
And since p ∈ (1,∞), the inequality in (25) is strict if x is not parallel to y. For H? (using Equation (24)),
H?(θf + (1− θ)g) =− θf1 − (1− θ)g1
+
∥∥θ[(0, 1)− f ] + (1− θ)[(0, 1)− g]∥∥
p
+
∥∥θf + (1− θ)g∥∥
p
− 1. (26)
Because of convexity of the Lp norm, both the third and fourth term on the RHS of Equation (26) satisfy inequal-
ity (25). Further, because at least one of the pair of vectors in these two terms is not parallel (since either (i) or (ii) is
true), at least one of them gives us a strict inequality. Therefore we obtain
H?(θf + (1− θ)g) < θH?(f) + (1− θ)H?(g).
Proof of Claim 5. To compute the minimizer of H?, we compute its gradients with respect to f1 and f2. Using Equa-
tion (11), the partial derivative with respect to f1 is
∂H?
∂f1
= −1 + fp−11
[
fp1 + (1− f2)p
] 1
p−1
+ fp−11
[
fp1 + f
p
2
] 1
p−1
(27)
and with respect to f2 is
∂H?
∂f2
= 0− (1− f2)p−1
[
fp1 + (1− f2)p
] 1
p−1
+ fp−12
[
fp1 + f
p
2
] 1
p−1
. (28)
Observe that at f2 = 12 , irrespective of the value of f1, the partial derivative (28) is
∂H?
∂f2
∣∣∣∣
f2=
1
2
= − 1
2p−1
[
fp1 +
1
2p
] 1
p−1
+
1
2p−1
[
fp1 +
1
2p
] 1
p−1
= 0.
So, set v̂2 = 12 . Next, we find v̂1 such that the other derivative (27) is also zero at v̂ = (v̂1, v̂2). Setting (27) to zero at
v̂, we obtain
∂H?
∂f1
∣∣∣∣
f=v̂
= 0 = −1 + v̂p−11
[
v̂p1 +
1
2p
] 1
p−1
+ v̂p−11
[
v̂p1 +
1
2p
] 1
p−1
=⇒ 1 = 2v̂p−11
[
v̂p1 +
1
2p
] 1
p−1
=⇒
[
v̂p1 +
1
2p
]1− 1p
= 2v̂p−11
=⇒
[
v̂p1 +
1
2p
]p−1
= 2pv̂
p(p−1)
1
=⇒ v̂p1 +
1
2p
= 2
p
p−1 v̂p1
=⇒ 1
2p
= v̂p1
(
2
p
p−1 − 1
)
∴ v̂1 =
1
2
[
1
(2
p
p−1 − 1)
] 1
p
.
Hence, ∇fH?(f) = 0 at v̂. And since H? is convex in [0, 1]2 by Claim 4, v̂ is the minimizer in this region.
Proof of Claim 6. For any p > 1, we know
p
p− 1 > 1.
This implies that
2
p
p−1 − 1 > 1 and hence
[
1
2
p
p−1 − 1
] 1
p
< 1.
Finally, using the values from Claim 5, we obtain
v̂1 < v̂2.
Proof of Claim 7. Let z ∈ Z(1, 1). Pick an arbitrary (f1, f2) ∈ [0, 1]2. As in the proof of Claim 3, on subtracting
Equations (10) and (11), and taking an absolute value, we obtain Equation (21), that is,
|Hz(f1, f2)−H?(f1, f2)| =
[(
z − f1
)p
+ fp2
] 1
p − (z − f1). (29)
Combining Equation (29) with the fact that 0 ≤ f2 ≤ 1, we obtain
|Hz(f1, f2)−H?(f1, f2)| ≤
[(
z − f1
)p
+ 1
] 1
p − (z − f1). (30)
Now, define ψ(x) = (xp + 1)
1
p − x. We show that ψ(x) is a non-increasing function for x ≥ 0. Computing the
derivative, we have
dψ(x)
dx
= xp−1 (xp + 1)
1
p−1 − 1 =
(
xp
xp + 1
) p−1
p
− 1 ≤ 0
for x ≥ 0, showing that it is a non-increasing function. Going back to Equation (30), we know that f1 ≤ 1. Therefore,(
z − f1
) ≥ (z − 1) ≥ 0. Using the fact that ψ is a non-increasing function, we obtain ψ(z − f1) ≤ ψ(z − 1), which
on expansion gives us[(
z − f1
)p
+ 1
] 1
p − (z − f1) ≤ [(z − 1)p + 1] 1p − (z − 1) = |Hz(1, 1)−H?(1, 1)|. (31)
Combining Equations (30) and (31), and the fact that z ∈ Z(1, 1), we obtain
|Hz(f1, f2)−H?(f1, f2)| ≤ |Hz(1, 1)−H?(1, 1)| < .
Hence, z ∈ Z(f1, f2).
Proof of Claim 8. The proof follows using three facts:
1. Equation (15) for f̂(z) says that H?(f̂(z)) < Hz(f̂(z)) + .
2. Because f̂(z) is the minimizer of Hz , we have Hz(f̂(z)) ≤ Hz(v̂).
3. For v̂, Equation (15) gives us Hz(v̂) < H?(v̂) + .
Putting these equations together:
H?(f̂(z)) < Hz(f̂(z)) +  ≤ Hz(v̂) +  < H?(v̂) + 2.
Proof of Claim 9. We prove the claim by contraposition. Pick an arbitrary f ∈ [0, 1]2 such that ‖f − v̂‖2 > ∆4 . This
means that there exists g ∈ [0, 1]2 on the line joining f and v̂ such that ‖g − v̂‖2 = ∆4 . We could alternatively write
g = θf + (1− θ)v̂, where θ ∈ (0, 1). By convexity of H?,
H?(g) ≤ θH?(f) + (1− θ)H?(v̂). (32)
By definition of τ in (16), we know H?(g) ≥ τ . Also, we know H?(v̂) < τ . Using these in (32), we obtain
τ < θH?(f) + (1− θ)τ.
Therefore, we obtain H?(f) > τ . In summary, if ‖f − v̂‖2 > ∆4 , then H?(f) > τ . Taking the contrapositive gives us
the desired result.
A.4 Proof of Lemma 4
The key idea of the proof lies in the form taken by the minimizer of L(1, 1) loss. When each reviewer reviews every
paper and the papers have objective criteria scores, L(1, 1) aggregation reduces to computing
f̂ ∈ argmin
f∈F
{∑
i∈R
∑
a∈P
|yia − f(xa)|
}
, (33)
where ties are broken by picking the minimizer with minimum L2 norm. We claim that the aggregate function is given
by
f̂(xa) = left-med({yia}i∈R) ∀a ∈ P,
where left-med(·) of a set of points is their left median. We prove this claim by showing four parts: (i) f̂ is a valid
function, (ii) f̂ is an unconstrained minimizer of the objective in (33), (iii) f̂ satisfies the constraints of (33), i.e.,
f̂ ∈ F , and (iv) f̂ has the minimum L2 norm among all minimizers of (33).
We start by proving part (i). This part can only be violated if there are two papers a and b such that xa = xb, but
left-med({yia}i∈R) 6= left-med({yib}i∈R), leading to f̂ having two function values for the same x-value. However,
we assumed that each reviewer i has a function g?i used to score the papers. So, for the two papers a and b, we would
have yia = g?i (xa) = g
?
i (xb) = yib for every i, giving us left-med({yia}i∈R) = left-med({yib}i∈R). Therefore, f̂ is
a valid function.
For part (ii), consider the optimization problem (33) without any constraints. Denote the objective function asG(f).
Rearranging terms, we obtain
G(f) =
∑
a∈P
∑
i∈R
|yia − f(xa)| . (34)
Consider the inner summation
∑
i∈R |yia − f(xa)|; it is obvious that this quantity is minimized when f(xa) is any
median of the {yia}i∈R values. Hence, we have
G(f) =
∑
a∈P
∑
i∈R
|yia − f(xa)| ≥
∑
a∈P
∑
i∈R
|yia − left-med({yia}i∈R)| = G(f̂), (35)
where f is an arbitrary function. Therefore, f̂ minimizes the objective function even in the absence of any constraints,
proving part (ii).
Turning to part (iii), we show that f̂ satisfies the monotonicity constraints, i.e., f̂ ∈ F . Suppose a, b ∈ P are such
that xa ≥ xb. Using the fact that each reviewer i scores papers based on the function g?i , we have yia = g?i (xa) and
yib = g
?
i (xb). And since g
?
i ∈ F obeys monotonicity constraints, we obtain yia ≥ yib for every i. This trivially implies
that left-med({yia}i∈R) ≥ left-med({yib}i∈R), i.e., f̂(xa) ≥ f̂(xb), completing part (iii).
Finally, we prove part (iv). Observe that equation (35) is a strict inequality if there is a paper a for which f(xa) is
not a median of the {yia}i∈R values. In other words, the only functions f that have the same objective function value
as f̂ are of the form
f(xa) ∈ med({yia}i∈R) ∀a ∈ P, (36)
where med(·) of a collection of points is the set of all points between (and including) the left and right medians.
Hence, all other minimizers of (33) must satisfy Equation (36). Observe that f̂ is pointwise smaller than any of these
functions, since it computes the left median at each of the x-values. Therefore, f̂ has the minimum L2 norm among
all possible minimizers of (33), completing the proof of part (iv).
Combining all four parts proves that f̂ is indeed the aggregate function chosen by L(1, 1) aggregation. We use this
to prove that L(1, 1) aggregation satisfies consensus, efficiency and strategyproofness.
Consensus. Let a ∈ P be a paper such that y1a = y2a = · · · = yma = r for some r. Then, left-med({yia}i∈R) = r.
Hence, f̂(xa) = r, satisfying consensus.
Efficiency. Let a, b ∈ P be such that a dominates b. In other words, the sorted overall recommendations given to a
pointwise-dominate the sorted overall recommendations given to b. So, by definition, left-med({yia}i∈R) is at least as
large as left-med({yib}i∈R). That is, f̂(xa) ≥ f̂(xb), satisfying efficiency.
Strategyproofness. Let i be an arbitrary reviewer. Observe that in this setting, the aggregate score f̂(xa) of a paper
a depends only on the score yia and not on other scores {yib}b 6=a given by reviewer i. In other words, the only way
to manipulate f̂(xa) = left-med({yia}i∈R) is by changing yia. Consider three cases. Suppose yia < f̂(xa). In this
case, if reviewer i reports y′ia ≤ f̂(xa), then there is no change in the aggregate score of a. On the other hand,
if y′ia > f̂(xa), then either the aggregate score of a remains the same or increases, making things only worse for
reviewer i. The other case of yia > f̂(xa) is symmetric to yia < f̂(xa). Consider the third case, yia = f̂(xa). In this
case, manipulation can only make things worse since we already have |yia − f̂(xa)| = 0. In summary, reporting y′ia
instead of yia cannot help decrease |yia − f̂(xa)|. Also, recall that yia does not affect the aggregate scores of other
papers, and hence manipulation of yia does not help them either. Therefore, by manipulating any of the yia scores,
revieiwer i cannot bring the aggregate recommendations closer to her own, proving strategyproofness.
B Additional Empirical Results
We present some more empirical results in addition to those provided in the main text.
B.1 Influence of Varying p, q
Although our theoretical results identify L(1, 1) aggregation as the most desirable, we would like to paint a broader
picture by determining how much impact the choice of p and q actually has on selected papers. To this end, we compute
the overlap between the papers selected by L(p, q) aggregation, for p, q ∈ {1, 2, 3} (although in general p and q need
not be integral, they can be real as well as∞). Table 3 shows the overlap between papers selected by L(p1, q1) and
L(p2, q2), where the rows represent (p1, q1) and columns represent (p2, q2). Since the table is symmetric, we show
only the upper triangle to avoid clutter. The results suggest that q has a more significant impact than p on L(p, q)
aggregation. For instance, L(1, 1) behaves more similarly to L(2, 1) and L(3, 1) than to L(1, 2) and L(1, 3).
B.2 Influence of Varying Criteria
Figures 5 and 6 present the visualizations of f̂ as remaining pairs of criteria are varied.
1,1 1,2 1,3 2,1 2,2 2,3 3,1 3,2 3,3
1,1 100.0 87.5 82.7 96.1 88.0 82.6 92.3 87.5 82.1
1,2 100.0 94.5 88.3 94.9 93.1 87.7 94.6 92.3
1,3 100.0 84.0 92.1 95.2 83.5 91.8 94.0
2,1 100.0 89.8 84.4 95.7 89.5 84.0
2,2 100.0 94.1 89.8 98.8 93.7
2,3 100.0 84.4 94.1 98.6
3,1 100.0 89.7 84.0
3,2 100.0 93.8
3,3 100.0
Table 3: Percentage of overlap (in selected papers) between different L(p, q) aggregation methods
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(a) Varying ‘quality of writing’ and ‘relevance’
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(b) Varying ‘quality of writing’ and ‘originality’
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(c) Varying ‘quality of writing’ and ‘technical quality’
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(d) Varying ‘originality’ and ‘relevance’
Figure 5: Impact of varying different criteria under L(1, 1) aggregation
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(a) Varying ‘significance’ and ‘technical quality’
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(d) Varying ‘originality’ and ‘technical quality’
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(e) Varying ‘originality’ and ‘significance’
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(f) Varying ‘quality of writing’ and ‘significance’
Figure 6: Impact of varying different criteria under L(1, 1) aggregation (continued)
